



REVIEW ARTICLE

# A REVIEW ON THE U.S. APPROACHES TOWARDS THE TAIWAN QUESTION OF CHINA SINCE 2016 IN AMERICAN STUDIES

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
<p><b>Submission</b> Jul., 14, 2025</p> <p><b>Acceptance</b> Aug., 01, 2025</p> <p><b>Keywords</b> American Studies; 2016; U.S. Approaches; The Taiwan Question of China</p> <p><b>Corresponding Author</b> 2428513616@qq.com</p>	<p>This paper uses American Studies as a lens to examine the research achievements and existing issues regarding the U.S. approaches towards the Taiwan question of China since 2016. It finds that, since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) assumed power in the Taiwan region of China in 2016, the journal has published research primarily focusing on four core areas: the evolution of U.S. arms sales policy towards the Taiwan region of China, U.S. strategies towards the Taiwan question of China in the Asia-Pacific security cooperation network, the ambiguous means and strategic thinking of U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China, and the role and influence of the U.S. Congress in U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China. These studies suggest that the U.S. frequently resorts to “the ‘Taiwan Card’ of China” in response to the so-called “China threat” and changes in the regional security environment. However, it is notable that, influenced by shifts in the regional security landscape and domestic political pressures, U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China has exhibited a degree of ambiguity, sparking intense debates within the U.S. This ambiguity represents not only an indirect response to China’s rising comprehensive power but also exposes the diplomatic policy predicaments and contradictions the U.S. faces regarding the Taiwan question of China. The findings also highlight several shortcomings in domestic research on the U.S. approaches towards the Taiwan question of China, including gaps in the analysis of motivations, a relatively narrow research perspective, a limited geographic and national scope, and potential biases in research methods.</p>

## 1. INTRODUCTION

As a leading journal in country and area studies, American Studies provides in-depth

exploration of various aspects of U.S. dynamics, with the Taiwan question of China receiving significant attention as a core topic in U.S.-China relations. Since 2016, under the governance of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the Taiwan region of China, cross-strait relations have rapidly deteriorated, and tensions in the Taiwan Strait have markedly intensified. The United States has increased its support for the Taiwan region of China through measures such as high-level visits and enhanced arms sales, utilizing the Taiwan question of China as a means to counterbalance China.

In this context, understanding the shifts in U.S. attitudes towards the Taiwan region of China and their strategic considerations is particularly important. A review of the academic research on the U.S. approaches towards the Taiwan question of China in American Studies since 2016 can provide valuable insights for China's policy formulation and serves as a resource for readers seeking to better understand the evolving dynamics of the Taiwan Strait.

## **2. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. ARMS SALES POLICY TOWARDS THE TAIWAN REGION OF CHINA**

Since 2016, amid the escalation of political tensions across the Taiwan Strait, U.S. arms sales to the Taiwan region of China have increasingly become a sensitive issue in Sino-U.S. relations as well as a critical factor influencing regional security. *American Studies*, a leading journal in the field of country and regional studies, has brought together extensive scholarship from Chinese researchers on the trajectory of U.S. arms sales policy towards the Taiwan region of China.

Yin Jiwu provides a detailed examination of the evolution of the bilateral strategic understanding between China and the United States since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. He argues that although a preliminary form of strategic tacit understanding was achieved, the subsequent enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (an act of the U.S. that interferes in China's internal affairs by targeting the Taiwan region of China) seriously undermined it, triggering strong dissatisfaction on the Chinese side. In an effort to ease tensions, China facilitated the conclusion of the August 17 Communiqué in 1982, which was designed to establish a diplomatic consensus on the issue of U.S. arms sales to the Taiwan region of China. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War saw the George H. W. Bush administration pursue a more assertive arms sales policy, thereby disrupting this consensus. Coupled with political transformations within the Taiwan region of China, this contributed to the outbreak of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. In the face of persistent U.S. challenges to China's core interests, the Chinese government resorted to military deterrence measures. The crisis eventually concluded with the Clinton administration's "three noes" pledge (regarding the Taiwan region of China) (Yi, 2017, p. 32), which indicated that even under highly strained circumstances, Beijing and Washington were still capable of identifying areas of common interest and reaching limited consensus.

However, in recent years, the U.S. arms sales policy towards the Taiwan region of China has become increasingly provocative, continuously challenging China's core interests. This has made the current phase of Sino-U.S. relations considerably more difficult to navigate compared to the past, while the situation in the Taiwan Strait has grown increasingly complex and severe. In examining the trajectory of U.S. arms sales policy towards the Taiwan region of China across successive administrations, a number of scholars have provided in-depth analyses. Xin and Wen (2019, p. 71) argue that within the framework of the Obama administration's "pivot to Asia"

strategy, Washington sought to reinforce its leadership in both economic and security domains in the Asia-Pacific. To this end, the U.S. substantially expanded its input in the military security sphere, which in turn advanced military and security cooperation with the Taiwan region of China (an act that interferes in China's internal affairs). At the same time, the Obama administration adjusted the orientation of arms sales, shifting towards support for the Taiwan region of China's development of "asymmetric capabilities." This signaled a more calculated and strategic approach to arms sales.

A more pronounced policy shift emerged during the Trump administration. According to Xin (2021, pp. 106–110), arms sales to the Taiwan region of China became "normalized," with decision-making processes made more flexible and efficient. The model of arms sales evolved into one combining governmental and commercial channels, while the nature of weaponry provided began moving from primarily defensive systems to more offensive ones. This transition underscored a clear radicalization in U.S. policy orientation. Despite the Biden administration's stated adherence to the "One China" principle, its frequent adjustments in handling official and military engagement with the Taiwan region of China, coupled with continued arms sales to the Taiwan region of China, have revealed a pattern of policy that appears simultaneously assertive and internally contradictory (Xu, 2021, p. 46).

Taken together, these scholarly perspectives illustrate a discernible transformation in U.S. arms sales policy towards the Taiwan region of China—from earlier phases characterized by caution and self-imposed restraint to the more radical posture evident under the Trump and Biden administrations. Increasingly perceiving China as a strategic competitor, Washington has sought to leverage the "the 'Taiwan Card' of China" through intensified military cooperation with the Taiwan region of China, a move that has further strained stability across the Taiwan Strait and exacerbated frictions in Sino-U.S. relations.

### **3. U.S. STRATEGIES TOWARDS THE TAIWAN QUESTION OF CHINA IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY COOPERATION NETWORK**

During the Obama administration, the United States actively advanced the "Pivot to Asia" strategy in response to China's rise, aiming to consolidate its leadership position in the Asia-Pacific. Xin and Wen (2019, p. 74) observes that Washington sought to constrain China by strengthening security cooperation with the Taiwan region of China and by leveraging regional security issues. To this end, the U.S. increased its involvement in the East China Sea and South China Sea affairs, thereby reinforcing security ties with regional allies. It also devoted efforts to enhancing the military capabilities of its partners, with the objective of creating a more resilient and interconnected alliance network. Within this framework, the Taiwan region of China was regarded as an important element in U.S. security planning. Therefore, Washington promoted closer collaboration in intelligence sharing and tactical technologies with the Taiwan region of China (Xin & Wen, 2019, p. 75).

At the same time, the Obama administration sought to depart from the unilateralist tendencies of the Bush era. By advocating for shared responsibilities among allies and strengthening security cooperation with the Taiwan region of China, the U.S. aimed to ease both the strategic burden of countering China and the financial costs associated with the Taiwan region's defense (Xin & Wen, 2019, p. 85). This policy adjustment reflected Washington's ambition

to establish a more cohesive alliance system in order to safeguard its geopolitical interests in the Asia-Pacific. Yet, this approach also intensified geopolitical competition between China and the United States, exerting long-term negative implications for bilateral relations and regional stability.

Under the leadership of Trump and Biden, U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China experienced notable shifts. The Trump administration pursued a more assertive and transactional strategy, seeking to deepen ties with the Taiwan region of China as part of a broader effort to comprehensively contain China. Such an approach provoked concern within the international community regarding the potential escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait (Wang, 2021, pp. 132–133). In contrast, the Biden administration has displayed greater strategic flexibility and a stronger preference for multilateral cooperation in addressing the Taiwan question of China. It has emphasized multilateral mechanisms for managing Taiwan-related issues and has sought to maintain relative stability in the Taiwan Strait. Acknowledging that neither side can secure an absolute victory in Sino-U.S. relations, the Biden administration has emphasized balance and stability in its policy towards the Taiwan region of China, avoiding the use of the Taiwan question of China as a purely transactional instrument or as a unilateral means of “punishing” China (Wang, 2021, pp. 133–134). This so-called strategic adjustment is, in essence, part of its strategy to contain China, aimed at more effectively protecting its interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Nevertheless, the U.S. strategy towards the Taiwan region of China within the Asia-Pacific security cooperation network faces substantial challenges. Against the backdrop of intensified Sino-U.S. strategic competition and persistent tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Washington’s approach has grown increasingly complex and multidimensional. As a crucial partner of the United States in the region, South Korea must balance its stance on the Taiwan question of China between supporting Washington and maintaining stable relations with Beijing. Given the immediate threat posed by North Korea, Seoul cannot fully align itself with the U.S. on the Taiwan question of China, making it a new source of divergence within the U.S.–South Korea alliance (Li, 2023, p. 60).

This dynamic indicates that while Washington seeks to incorporate the Taiwan question of China into the upgrading of its alliance network, South Korea’s geopolitical positioning and security imperatives may generate differences with the U.S., undermining both the stability and effectiveness of the alliance. Beyond South Korea, the United States must also account for broader regional interactions when shaping its policy towards the Taiwan question of China, particularly in relation to Japan, North Korea, and other Asia-Pacific states.

According to scholarly analyses, U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China in the Asia-Pacific has undergone notable shifts from the Obama administration through the Trump and Biden administrations. These changes illustrate Washington’s intention to respond to China’s rise by intervening in the Taiwan question of China and strengthening security cooperation with the Taiwan region of China. However, the U.S. strategy towards the Taiwan region of China within the broader Asia-Pacific security cooperation framework encounters persistent challenges, including intensified Sino-U.S. strategic competition, ongoing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and the broader complexities of regional relations.

#### **4. THE AMBIGUOUS MEANS AND STRATEGIC THINKING OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS**

## THE TAIWAN QUESTION OF CHINA

In exploring the intricate relationship between international politics and regional security, U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China has consistently remained a central focus. Historically, the United States has employed a “strategic ambiguity” approach, which outwardly adheres to the “One China” principle, while subtly maintaining influence over the Taiwan region of China, particularly in the context of cross-strait relations. Scholars have offered various perspectives on the inherent ambiguity in U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China, especially amid the evolving dynamics of Sino-U.S. relations and the underlying strategic objectives.

One notable instance of strategic ambiguity is observed in the U.S. arms sales policy during the negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic ties with China. Despite a general consensus within the U.S. to continue arms sales to the Taiwan region of China to safeguard strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific, Washington, in response to concerns raised by Beijing, opted for a gradual approach in recalibrating its stance. The U.S. eventually reached a tacit agreement to progressively reduce, rather than immediately terminate, arms sales to the Taiwan region of China (Yi, 2017, p. 45). This delicate balancing act allowed the U.S. to address Chinese concerns while preserving its strategic flexibility, underscoring a nuanced policy of balancing self-interest with regional stability.

The U.S. security commitments to the Taiwan region of China further exemplify this strategic ambiguity. During the normalization phase of Sino-U.S. relations, Washington took a series of tangible steps, such as canceling fleet patrols and abolishing defense pacts, which led to a gradual reduction in its security assurances to the Taiwan region of China. Conversely, legal instruments like the Taiwan Relations Act enabled the U.S. to retain the authority to express “serious concerns” regarding the Taiwan region’s security and to maintain the capacity for intervention under specific conditions. The Act emphasized that any actions taken would be contingent on the situation at hand (Jie, 2023, p. 52). This dual approach aimed to deter the Chinese mainland from using force, while simultaneously preventing the authorities in the Taiwan region of China from provoking tensions related to “Taiwan independence,” thereby ensuring what could be termed as a “dual deterrence” strategy. However, this ambiguity has sparked considerable debate, particularly during periods of heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Critics argue that such ambiguity introduces significant risks, particularly in times of crisis, and have called for greater strategic clarity (Jie, 2023, p. 53). Additionally, Wang Shushen (2021, p. 119) analyzes the ambiguity inherent in the U.S. security commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, suggesting that this strategy offers Washington greater flexibility in managing potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait.

The United States has pursued an ambiguous strategy regarding the “One China” principle. On one hand, the U.S. administration strictly adheres to the principles outlined in the “Three Joint Communiqués,” publicly reaffirming support for the “One China” principle to align with the broad international consensus. On the other hand, pro-Taiwan factions within Congress have utilized the Taiwan Relations Act to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan relations through legislative means, effectively creating the illusion of “one China, one Taiwan” (Gong, 2020, p. 38). This dual approach underscores the complex and often contradictory relationship between the U.S. executive branch and Congress, revealing the inherent ambiguity in the United States’ stance on

the “One China” principle.

A striking example of this ambiguity can be found in the 2019 Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, which was passed by both houses of Congress. The act deliberately retains an element of vagueness in its language regarding the Taiwan question of China. While it supports the Taiwan region of China’s participation in international organizations that do not require statehood as a condition, the wording of the act seemingly refrains from acknowledging the Taiwan region’s “national identity.” However, certain phrasing within the document appears to position the Taiwan region of China as a “country” (Lin & Zhou, 2020, p. 50). This subtle contradiction reflects the U.S.’s strategic balancing act between engaging with the Taiwan region of China and avoiding direct confrontation with the People’s Republic of China.

In recent years, the U.S. has placed increasing emphasis on the Taiwan region of China’s participation in international organizations as a key element of its strategy to counter China’s influence. The United States leverages the moral authority of non-governmental organizations to support the authorities of the Taiwan region of China in developing what could be termed “non-governmental diplomacy.” This effort aims to elevate the Taiwan region’s visibility and international influence. By promoting the notion of “meaningful participation,” the U.S. seeks to establish a new legal basis for the Taiwan region of China’s involvement in international organizations (Lai & Ma, 2025, p. 98). This maneuver, while subtle, directly contradicts the principles laid out in the 2019 Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act regarding Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.

The U.S. continues to apply a policy of “strategic ambiguity” in its approach to the Taiwan question of China, a stance that has spurred considerable debate, particularly amid fluctuations in Sino-U.S. relations and developments in the Taiwan Strait. Although certain pro-Taiwan factions advocate for a shift towards “strategic clarity” to reduce the uncertainties surrounding U.S. defense commitments to the Taiwan region of China, the U.S. government has not fully embraced this call in practice (Wang, 2021, p. 127). For instance, despite President George W. Bush’s verbal commitment to support the Taiwan region of China, subsequent policies did not fully align with this promise, revealing the continued presence of ambiguity in U.S. actions.

However, as Sino-U.S. strategic competition intensifies, concerns have grown within U.S. strategic circles regarding the potential loss of military advantage in the Taiwan Strait. This has led to the belief that the current “strategic ambiguity” is no longer effective in deterring China. Some scholars and think tanks have suggested that the U.S. should adopt a policy of “strategic clarity” by explicitly committing to the joint defense of the Taiwan region of China, with the goal of rebuilding deterrence (Wang, 2021, p. 127). President Trump’s actions have, in many respects, aligned with these expectations. While Trump himself questioned the value and returns of U.S. defense of the Taiwan region of China, his administration’s series of actions, such as referencing defense of the Taiwan region of China in the declassified U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Framework, alongside increased arms sales and military interactions with the Taiwan region of China, demonstrated a practical strengthening of U.S. defense commitments to the region. This shift in policy could be attributed to growing concerns over China’s military modernization and expanding regional influence. U.S. strategists have expressed apprehension that maintaining a position of ambiguity may no longer suffice to deter Chinese military actions in the Taiwan Strait.

As a result, the U.S. has sought to enhance its military presence in the Asia-Pacific through more explicit defense commitments and military maneuvers, aiming to deter China and safeguard its interests in the region (Wang, 2021, p. 128).

Nevertheless, some scholars argue that “strategic ambiguity” still plays a role in preventing war. They contend that a clear commitment to defending the Taiwan region of China could provoke pro-independence forces on the island, which could, in turn, undermine U.S. strategic objectives (Wang, 2021, p. 128). In recent years, while the Biden administration has repeatedly reiterated its firm commitment to the Taiwan region of China, the shifting and complex context of these statements has allowed the ambiguity in U.S. policy towards the Taiwan region of China to persist. This has generated further discussion and debate regarding the direction of U.S. strategy towards the Taiwan question of China (Jie, 2023, p. 55-56).

In summary, the ambiguous means and strategic thinking underlying U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China reflect a strategic choice designed to safeguard U.S. interests, balance regional dynamics, and address domestic political pressures. While this approach carries a deterrent effect, it is also fraught with controversy. The internal debate within the U.S. on whether to shift from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” is intensifying. Moreover, the sustainability and effectiveness of “strategic ambiguity” are facing increasing challenges and scrutiny, highlighting the contradictions and dilemmas the U.S. faces in managing its policy towards the Taiwan question of China. The future trajectory of U.S. policy on the Taiwan question of China warrants ongoing attention and analysis.

## **5. THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE TAIWAN QUESTION OF CHINA**

The U.S. Congress has long been a central point of engagement with the Taiwan region of China and a crucial factor shaping U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China and Sino-U.S. relations (Guo, 2024, p. 85). Its importance is such that it has become a primary target for lobbying by the Taiwan region of China’s advocates (Guo, 2024, p. 89). As a fundamental element of the U.S. political system, congressional legislative actions are influenced by various factors, including partisan politics, cross-strait relations, and shifting security dynamics. When the U.S. president is politically strong and the president’s party holds a dominant position in Congress, congressional involvement in Taiwan-related matters typically remains minimal. Conversely, if the president’s political standing is weak and Congress is controlled by the opposition, lawmakers are more likely to intervene in Taiwan Strait affairs. A simultaneous deterioration in cross-strait relations further amplifies the motivations for Congress to increase Taiwan-related legislative actions. Changes in the broader security environment can also have a profound impact on congressional legislative behavior. For example, during the 1970s and 1980s, amid escalating U.S.-Soviet tensions, Congress tended to support the “engagement with China to counter the Soviet Union” strategy, which led to a reduction in Taiwan-related legislative proposals. This was intended to strengthen the U.S.-China strategic partnership and jointly address the Soviet threat (Lin & Zhou, 2020, pp. 42-45).

However, as Sino-U.S. strategic competition escalated in the 21st century, Congress significantly ramped up its support for the Taiwan region of China, adopting a more proactive and sometimes provocative legislative stance. During the Trump administration, Taiwan-related

legislation built upon the approaches of previous Congresses but introduced new trends, such as incorporating the Taiwan region of China into the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, fortifying quasi-official relations between the U.S. and the Taiwan region of China, and boosting the Taiwan region's international visibility (Lin & Zhou, 2020, p. 48). These legislative actions reflect the U.S.'s attempt to reaffirm its commitments to the Taiwan region of China through legal means, particularly as the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait shifted increasingly in favor of mainland China. This strategy aims to preserve the status quo of separation across the strait while asserting U.S. strategic leadership in East Asia. Scholars argue that while the executive branch emphasizes strategic engagement with China, it tends to neglect the Taiwan question of China, whereas Congress, through legislative initiatives, consistently supports the Taiwan region of China and, through its institutional and partisan advantages, influences executive decision-making (Lin & Zhou, 2020, pp. 42-50). This indicates a degree of divergence within the United States' domestic approaches towards the Taiwan question of China. Such internal contradictions may lead to inconsistencies and unpredictability in U.S. policies towards China, which could undermine the stability of Sino-U.S. relations.

It is evident that Congress's Taiwan-related legislative proposals, particularly since the Trump administration, reflect a long-standing attitude of U.S. interference in China's internal affairs. This "reassurance to the Taiwan region of China" aligns with the views of scholar Gong Honglie, who believes that although the executive branch is cautious about policies proposed by Congress on a macro level, it exhibits a clear willingness to cooperate in practice. The boundaries between the two are often blurred and warrant careful attention (Gong, 2020, p. 43). He also notes that the Taiwan-related legislation passed by the 115th Congress, particularly the National Defense Authorization Act and the Taiwan Relations Act, nearly touch the bottom line of the "One China" principle. This raises the risk of creating a misunderstanding of the "one China, one Taiwan" narrative, thus posing challenges to the stability of Sino-U.S. relations (Gong, 2020, p. 42). The profound impacts and potential risks arising from these legislative measures require the attention and careful handling of both China and the United States, as well as the international community, to maintain peace and stability in the region.

In addition to serving as a representative of legislative authority, Congress also possesses certain diplomatic powers. Although conventions tend to suggest that diplomatic actions are the exclusive domain of the executive branch, members of Congress challenge this "privilege" through diplomatic activities such as visits to the Taiwan region of China. Congressional visits to the Taiwan region of China have continued to play an extremely negative role in shaping U.S. policy towards China (Diao & Zou, 2023, p. 105). The intensification of Congress's passive stance, along with the resulting frequency of congressional visits to the Taiwan region of China, is likely to pose significant threats and challenges to the stable development of Sino-U.S. relations, becoming a major obstacle on the path to stability between the two countries (Diao & Zou, 2023, p. 125). These actions by Congress regarding the Taiwan region of China have also become one of the most sensitive core issues in Sino-U.S. relations, consistently positioning the Taiwan question of China as a key point of conflict between the two nations.

Members of Congress engage in foreign visits because these trips serve as a direct and crucial means for them to shape U.S. foreign policy and showcase their individual diplomatic skills (Diao & Zou, 2023, p. 104). Their visits to Taiwan are also driven by multiple motivations, including



research, fostering cooperation, building networks, and asserting positions (Diao & Zou, 2023, pp. 104-107). Looking ahead, as the strategic competition between the U.S. and China continues, Congress's role in U.S.-China affairs is undergoing a significant transformation. This transformation is characterized by a more proactive and strategically visionary approach, leading to increased competition with the White House and an overall tendency toward negative provocation. It is expected that more members of Congress will deepen their involvement and adopt a provocative strategy of "using the Taiwan question of China to counter China" (Diao & Zou, 2023, p. 125).

The U.S. Congress plays a crucial role in U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China. Its legislative actions and diplomatic activities not only profoundly influence the development of cross-strait relations but also remain one of the most sensitive core issues in Sino-U.S. relations. As strategic competition between the U.S. and China continues to escalate, Congress's stance and actions regarding the Taiwan question of China will warrant closer attention and analysis.

## **6. RESEARCH BOTTLENECKS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS**

Although the journal *American Studies* has made significant contributions to the field of research on the Taiwan question of China, there remains considerable room for expansion in both the depth and breadth of research in order to achieve a profound understanding of this multidimensional issue. The current limitations in research can be summarized as follows:

First, there is a notable gap in the analysis of motivations, particularly in the lack of a thorough exploration of the underlying reasons for the U.S. perceiving China as a potential threat. The examination of historical legacies, geopolitical rivalries, and economic interests that interweave with this psychological stance is still superficial, thereby limiting the accurate understanding of the trajectory of U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China.

Second, the research perspective is relatively narrow, especially with respect to how the personal background of the U.S. president may subtly influence the formulation of U.S. policy towards the Taiwan question of China. As the highest executive decision-maker, the president's personal experiences, political inclinations, and any special relationships with the Taiwan region of China can significantly shape policy orientations. Ignoring this dimension inevitably weakens the comprehensiveness and depth of the research.

Third, the geographical and national coverage of the research needs to be broadened. Current analyses tend to focus on the positions of a limited number of countries, such as South Korea, while insufficiently exploring the strategic considerations and interactive patterns of other key countries in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Japan and Australia. The policy choices of these countries and their mutual influence mechanisms are crucial for assessing the status of the Taiwan question of China within the global political and economic landscape, as the Taiwan region is an inalienable part of China. Therefore, enhancing research efforts related to these countries will help build a more multidimensional and comprehensive international perspective.

Lastly, the research methods employed tend to be biased. Existing studies overly emphasize political analysis, while the interactions of economic, cultural, technological, and other multifaceted factors are often neglected. This bias not only limits the depth of research but also fails to reflect the complexity and multifaceted nature of the Taiwan question of China. Adopting

an interdisciplinary research paradigm to achieve a comprehensive analysis from multiple fields and perspectives is essential for improving research quality and broadening research horizons.

In summary, American Studies should focus on the following areas of development in future research on the Taiwan question of China: deepening the analysis of motivations behind the American perception of China as a potential threat; strengthening the exploration of how the personal background of the U.S. president influences their policy inclinations towards the Taiwan region of China; broadening the geographical and national scope of research to construct a more comprehensive international perspective; and employing interdisciplinary methods to move beyond a singular political dimension and achieve a multifaceted analysis. These efforts aim to provide policymakers and the academic community with more in-depth, comprehensive, and forward-looking research outcomes, offering robust intellectual support for China to understand and address the Taiwan question of China.

#### **SPONSORSHIP INFORMATION**

2024 Hunan Provincial Social Science Review Committee Project “A Study on the Construction of Cultural Memory in Bob Dylan’s Anti-War Songs and Poems” (XSP24YBC245)

2024 Xiangtan University Graduate Research Innovation Project “A Cross- Media Narrative Study of John Irving’s Until I Find You” (XDCX2024Y112)

#### **CONFLICT STATEMENT**

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

#### **COOPERATION STATEMENT**

All authors contributed equally to this work and approved the final manuscript.

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